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Introduction
Most advanced industrial states since about the early 1950's have been
faced with the problem of enlarging the units of their local government systems in order
to cope, firstly, with demographic change. That is to say, the considerable growth of
urban centres well beyond the existing boundaries of their local governments. The
second need for enlargement is derived from the expansion of local governments'
service responsibilities which has raised the issue of economies of scale and service
externalities. Increased scale of local governments is perceived as meeting both sets of
problems (1).
The extent of the response to local restructuring has varied considerably
among Western states from the United States, where it has been at its most modest, not
to say non-existent, to the United Kingdom where an almost manic zeal seems to have
been operating such that its local governments have been transformed into the biggest
in the Western world (2). Some idea of the extent of the difference between these two
extremes of local government modernization can be derived from the following table
which covers the period in the 1970's when the UK undertook major changes. Today
(1990) the difference between the two systems will almost certainly be greater.
Table1
Between these two extremes there is a wide range of responses which
encompasses two broad tendencies. In what may be called the napoleonic group of
West European states (Spain, France, Italy, Belgium) the local government structure has
been changed only minimally, and instead a new regional level of government between
the local government structure per se and the centre has been inserted (3). In the North
European group (Sweden, Norway, Denmark, West Germany), on the other hand, the
local government system has been extensively restructured, not with quite the
revolutionary abandon of the UK, but certainly to a much greater extent than in the
napoleonic group, with the possible exception of Belgium.
The Metropolitan Model
So much for the broad trends, within those trends there exists a special type of
modernization, that of the government of the large urban agglomeration, which will be the
principle subject of this paper (4). Such agglomerations can have different forms, but
this paper will be principally concerned with the agglomeration that contains one
dominant centre. As we shall see, the degree of restructuring of the government of the
large agglomeration can vary in practice from the minimal area wide structure to a highly
elaborate, entirely new system, but for the sake of convenience we will use the term
metropolitan, or metro, model to cover all of them. This is justified on the grounds that
the essence of the change is the recognition of the unity of at least the continuously built
up area of the agglomeration and that this unity is reflected in some form by area-wide
institutions or arrangements. The term pure metro model will be reserved for the cases
where not only is there a fully-fledged elected area-wide entity, but a consciously
designed second, lower level of smaller units as well.
The rationale for treating the continuously built up agglomeration as a single
entity is derived from two distinct sets of assumptions (5), which we will explore in
greater detail. Before we do, however, it must be emphasized that the case for creating
an area-wide authority, or, indeed, any structural change in local government, has been
subject to considerable criticism, especially in the United States. Briefly, such criticism
argues that small scale (i.e. the status quo) has special advantages for local
government among which maybe noted that it maintains a quasi-market, i.e. that the
existing fragmented metropolitan area corresponds to a kind of public service industry
and competition between local governments takes place as a consequence of which
the citizen gains much more than he loses by not having an overall authority. Secondly, it
is claimed, any metropolitan authority will always have great difficulty aggregating
consumer preferences and determining appropriate expenditure levels and at the same
time avoid the perils of bureaucratic aggrandisement (6).
So much for anti-metro theory. We will now turn to the pro-metro theories and
the first and the most widely acknowledged maybe called the externality principle. By
this it is meant the principle that local services should, as far as possible, be
self-contained so that they are paid for by the citizens that use them. For a local
government that finds itself because of urbanization imbedded in a continuously built up
area such self-containment is not possible simply because there is leakage, or
externalities, for some local services which are provided by the said local government
but "consumed" by outsiders. This problem is particularly acute in communications; for
example, an arterial road running through the said embedded local government and
maintained by it will be mainly used by outsiders who enter on the road at one end of it
and leave at the other. In no sense can such a road be defined as being self-contained
within the local government. A similar externality will arise for an underground railway
system or trunk sewers. Equally, the embedded authority can never effectively exercise
the land use planning function because the origin, and perhaps the solution, to its
planning problems are more than likely to be outside its jurisdiction. In short, most of
what may be called infrastructural services and especially communications may be
deemed to be indivisible; that is to say the can only be effectively provided or of
coordinated at the area-wide level.
The second logic, or rationale, for creating a single authority for the whole of
the urban agglomeration is derived from the tendency to spatial segregation of social
and occupational groups within the metropolitan area (7). Although the occupational
structure of the agglomeration reflects the needs of its various industries, local
government fragmentation may mean (and may be intended to mean) that the higher
income groups within the agglomeration can avoid the cost of redistributive services on
behalf of the lower paid, although such groups are essential to the economic health of
the agglomeration. It should be noted, however, that the degree of class segregation
between the local governments within a metropolitan area is likely to vary and in the US
at least, may be less than is often assumed (8). However, segregation will certainly exist
to some degree simply because high status suburbs are more expensive to live in. A
similar redistributive problem may occur in relation to essential area-wide institutional
services provided in the central area or central business district (CBD), but used by
people throughout the metro area, such as, parks, reference libraries, museums,
technical colleges and so on. There is a further set of area-wide services that the
C.B.D. must provide that may be called facilitatory rather than institutional. These
include traffic management, police, access highways, and public transport. Such
services not only facilitate the ingress and egress of outsiders to the institutional
services within the C.B.D. just listed, but more important, they make possible the diurnal
flows of outsiders who work in the C.B.D. but live beyond the central city.
A great deal of controversy surrounds this problem because it can be argued
that whereas it is true that the outsiders do not contribute directly to the cost of C.B.D.
services, outsider expenditure while in the C.B.D. and the taxable values they generate
by working there may compensate and even excede the benefits they receive from the
C.B.D.’s area-wide functions whether institutional or facilitatory (9). One of the best
analyses of the issue by Bradford and Oates has concluded:
'Our reading of the evidence suggests that suburban exploitation of central
cities interpreted as the failure of the suburbanites to bear their fair share of
the costs of city services is typically of minor quantitative importance' (10).
Wherever the true balance of costs and advantages lies, and obviously that
balance must vary from city to city, there can be no doubt that every service that is
transferred to an overall metro authority counteracts these maldistribution problems
because it can equalize on the service.
It is possible that the metropolitan-wide authority may be created simply by
extending the boundary of the existing but underbounded core city authority. In this way
the structure of government is unitary. Such. is the model applied in Oslo, and, in effect,
New York City at the time it was created. Its very unitariness does not in any sense
detract from it being an example of the metropolitan model. It is not an option that is
easily open to the very largest cities, however, simply because of scale. Moreover, it is
usually politically impossible for central cities to obliterate and absorb the municipalities
immediately surrounding them. Indeed, the almost universal political fact of the
metropolitan area is some degree of antagonism between core and periphery. It follows
that the most popular metropolitan model is a two level, or tier, structure. Some argue
that there is an inherent logic in the two tier model since it can resolve the eternal conflict
within local government between the values of participation, access and local identity on
the one hand and functional optimality and production efficiency on the other. The lower
tier of the metro model can cater for the first set of values and the top tier area-wide
authority the second (11). Within the two tier group a structure which leaves the existing
pattern of municipalities covering the agglomeration intact and merely superimposes the
metropolitan authority over it is perhaps the most popular of all. Examples of this type
include Barcelona, Stockholm, Montreal and Copenhagen. There are a few examples of
a restructured lower tier, the pure metro model, the best known being the London metro
(G.L.C.) and the six metropolitan systems that were created in other parts of England
(Manchester, Birmingham, Liverpool, Leeds, Sheffield and Newcastle), plus the most
celebrated example of all, the Toronto metro.
Whatever structural model is chosen, there remains the problem of which
functions are to be allocated to the metro authority itself. The list varies considerably
from country to country, but ideally it should include the following high externality, high
fixed cost, or indivisible functions:
Master planning
Arterial highways
Traffic management
Public transport
Trunk sewers and main drainage
Refuse disposal
Water supply
Police General utilities
Given that every function going to the metro level will usually mean a
subtraction from the functions of the existing local authorities, the full compliment of such
area-wide services is rarely, if ever, encountered among existing metro authorities. In
some cases the area-wide administration of some of these services may be achieved
by voluntary cooperation among the existing local governments without any formal
transfer of powers or permanent structural change. This is certainly the preferred mode
in the United States (12) which, as we have noted, has been the least keen to modernize
its local government structure. There is, however, some evidence that cooperative
arrangements in U.S. metropolitan areas extends well beyond the infrastructure
functions listed earlier and includes social welfare services as well (13). Possibly such
arrangements reflect the relatively greater fragmentation of American metropolitan
areas. Voluntary agreements by adjacent local governments in the urban
agglomerations is popular in many countries since it is the least difficult to create
politically and can always be wound up fairly easily. Voluntary cooperation of this kind
was, for example, the preferred method for tackling area-wide problems, particularly for
planning in France and has persisted in the form of the communautés urbains despite
the creation of regional governments in the early 1980's (14).
The Decline of the Metro Model
It has become increasingly clear during the 1980's that the metro solution is
probably less popular than it was. This change partly reflects no doubt a general decline
in the belief in governmental institutions that has become fashionable in that period. Of
much greater importance, however, is likely to be the general retreat from planning that
arose directly as a result of the end of the great post-war international trade boom in the
mid-1970's. With the onset of the recession, slower economic growth, and consequently
slower urban growth, has meant there is less need to plan for there is simply less to
plan; yet the need to plan -to create a long-term Master Plan for the urban
agglomeration- is at the very core of the metro idea. It would be inaccurate to link the
decline on the importance of planning solely to economic causes. Placing planning at
the pinnacle of urban government was also a fashion in the 1960s.
Given such trends, it is not wholly surprising that the metro idea has suffered a
decline. In some cases the decline has been such that metro governments have actually
been abolished. This is the case for Barcelona and Rotterdam where the metro
governments were wound up in the mid-1980's. Perhaps the most famous abolition
occurred in the U.K. in 1985 when not only was the Greater London Council abolished,
but so were the 6 other metro governments in England as well (15). There is also some
evidence that the metro governments of Copenhagen and Stockholm have declined in
prestige (16). The question is therefore posed, is the metropolitan government idea on
the way out as an interesting experiment that was essentially the product of the great
post war international trade boom and the planning fever of the 1960's and early 1970's
which accompanied it?
Obviously times and conditions change and governmental institutions are
always likely to change to match societal changes. However, it would be a shade
premature to write off the metro idea just yet. In the Barcelona case political antagonism
seems to have played a major part in the abolition, especially between the
socialist-controlled metro and the right wing regional Generalitat. It could also be argued
that a metro for Greater Barcelona became to some extent less essential once the
Generalitat got into its stride. The London abolition was even more sui generis for there
can be little doubt that G.L.C. was abolished from political spite and the government
which abolished it barely made the effort to mount even a modest case for abolition (17).
There was also certainly no alternative overall authority to shoulder some of the tasks of
the stricken G.L.C. Indeed, the G.L.C. abolition is one of the most bizarre in the history of
western government for it leaves London, one of the major cities of the world, not simply
without a metropolitan authority, but without any overall local government at all. So local
government in London is now in the hands of 32 London Boroughs and the City of
London and not even the London C.B.D. is accorded any unitary treatment institutionally
for it is divided between no less than seven Boroughs and the City. There is, however, a
joint committee of the C.B.D. Boroughs (18).
Two, then, of our three examples were abolished for reasons which have little
to do with the inherent character of the metro model. Any write-off of the metro idea
would also need to explain why the Toronto metro system still seems to be flourishing
and has indeed recently strengthened the metro authority by making it directly elected.
To Toronto's continued success would also have to be added Winnipeg, Tokyo and
Paris. It is even possible to discern an unintended but nevertheless emergent metro
authority in the form of the Madrid Autonomous Community which, like a social
geographer's dream, embraces most of the city's commuter hinterland with room to
spare for future growth. In other words, the picture the present day metro presents is a
mixed one and it seems doubtful whether this ambiguous position will ever be very
different, for it is a governmental design that is fraught with difficulties that will always
make its life problematic. The remainder of this essay will be devoted to pin pointing the
most salient of these difficulties.
Inherent Problems of the Metro Model
The first and perhaps the most obvious problem is where should the metro's
boundaries be drawn? According to the tenets of the externality principle the boundary
should encompass the core city's "influence area". But it is one thing to assume that
such an area exists in the abstract; it is quite another to define it in a concrete case.
Take the example of London, the G.L.C. boundary broadly corresponded to the
continuously built-up area which embraced about 7 million population. In planning terms
it was nothing like wide enough to exploit the advantages of self-containment. To do so it
needed to push out the boundary to cover what is known as the London Metropolitan
Region, but that would have doubled the G.L.C.'s population and covered an area seven
times bigger than the G.L.C.'s area (19). Even the narrowest boundary that would
remotely satisfy the socio-geographic definition of the “true” London would have added
another million population to the G.L.C. The problem is that self-containment for a metro
for a major city will entail a very large unit of government which would be decidedly
remote from its citizens and would raise the question as to whether it was local
government in the accepted sense. One way of minimizing this outcome is to keep the
range of functions of the metro as few as possible; that is to say to keep the extent of
horizontal area integration to the minimum. it follows, however, that the lower tier will
have to have more functions, but there is a basic range that the metro must retain in
order to perform its minimal tasks and effect coordination, so some functions will have to
be divided between the two levels. That is to say, there will have to be some vertical
functional disintegration with all the costs that such division will necessarily entail. The
essence then of resolving the metro boundary problem is a trade-off between the
horizontal integration of area and the disintegration of functions between the two levels.
There can be no right answers for this trade-off and whatever the balance that is struck,
the system that emerges will be complex and still require high levels of informal
cooperation between units within the system.
The second near-universal problem of the metro model, especially the pure
metro model, may be an unresolvable tension between the original core city and what it
may regard as being the upstart metro, and in addition tension between the core city
and the incorporated outer suburbs. The first source of tension will arise because the
core city may view the metro as a "fifth wheel to the coach" in the sense that the proud,
formerly independent, city will now have to share its name with the metro and lose some
of its independence to the unwanted interloper. In any case the core city is likely to be
the dominant local government in the metropolitan area. For example, of the seven
major metropolitan areas in Canada only in two does the central city not account for at
least 50 per cent of the metropolitan area's population. The proportions are as follows:
Table2
The second source of tension may be more serious because of, firstly, the
equalization problem. Almost certainly the core will be of a different social class
complexion from the suburbs. In Southern Europe the core city will tend to be more
bourgeois, in Northern Europe and in the “anglo” advanced Western states the core will
tend to be more working class. Whatever the class distribution, core and periphery will
have different interests in so far as the creation of the metro entails redistribution, and
the conflict is likely to be all the greater in Northern Europe and in the U.S., Canada and
Australia because, unlike Southern Europe, the core city being relatively poorer will have
a stronger case for passing on some of the costs of the provision of central city public
functions to the peripheral suburbs. These suburbs may also resent contributing to the
bill for the usually higher general costs of central cities (20). As one observer has
summarized the position for the US,
'In 1970 central cities spent 25 per cent more per capita on government
services than their suburban counterparts, and had 95 per cent higher per
capita non-educational expenditures than suburbs' (21)
These central city higher costs are likely to derive in part from the special
circumstances of the central city, such as higher land costs, a more expensive labour
market, and the 'honey pot effect' which attracts disproportionate numbers of high
consumers of public services such as the unemployed, the indigent, the old, one parent
families and so forth (22). But the suburbs may claim that the higher costs of the central
city may also derive from diseconomies of scale (which a metro system could
exacerbate) or just inefficient management.
All in all, it could not be said that the metro solution to the government of the
urban agglomeration faces an easy future. It is a frail barque at best that must always
have to negotiate choppy waters, so we may expect current successes to falter at some
stage and new metros to emerge only to sink in the seas of party political interests and
core city and suburban conflict. No one really loves metro government.
Table1
Table2
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